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THE UNWED FATHER: CONFLICT OF RIGHTS IN
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
WINSTON R. DAVIs
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of natural fathers of illegitimate children having a
constitutionally protected relationship with their children is rela-
tively new, but not surprising.' At common law, the biological father
of an illegitimate had no rights regarding his own child. Such chil-
dren were nullius filius, the children of no one.' Later, they were
considered filius populi, under the custody of the church2 Only
when the natural father married the mother and acknowledged the
children as his own was he considered to have legal rights regarding
them.' Increasing concern with expanded interpretation of constitu-
tionally protected rights and liberty interests has led to an extension
of rights to putative fathers so that when the mother surrenders her
children, dies, or remarries and consents for her new husband to
adopt the children, the natural father has a constitutional avenue.5
The family unit does not simply coexist with our constitutional
system, it is an integral part of it. The Supreme Court of the United
States has long acknowledged that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protects "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life" as one of the fundamental
liberties. The Court has held that history, not only of the United
States, but of western civilization, dictates a constitutional guaran-
tee of privacy for the family.7
It is instructive to note that the Court conceptually views the
family in a special position with respect to constitutional law.8 Early
cases reflect the historical tendency of the law to accord a superior
legal right to the mother when it was necessary to choose between
the parents in awarding custody.' For many years all jurisdictions
1. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 613-
14, 625-26 (1968).
2. See Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REV.
1071 (1966).
3. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 178 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Wis. 1970).
4. Id. at 65.
5. The term "putative father" will be used in this note to refer to one who claims to be
the natural father of a child. See generally In re Malpica-Orsini, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975); 61
CORNELL L. REV. 312, 312-14 (1976).
6. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974), cited in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977).
7. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
8. See Dobbs, Foster Care and Family Law: A Look at Smith v. Offer and the Constitu-
tional Rights of Foster Children and Their Families, 17 J. FAM. L. 1, 16-18 (1978-79).
9. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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in the United States have recognized the mother as the natural
guardian of the illegitimate child."
I1. CONSMERATIONS OF THE FAMILY
In the 1940's, the Supreme Court recognized the right to marry
and to have children as one of our basic civil liberties." Later, in
the 1950's, the Court began wrestling with the question of whether
a state could determine custody rights of children in an ex parte
divorce when the mother and children lived in another state. In May
v. Anderson, the Court found that the full faith and credit clause
was not proper justification to "cut off . . . [flights far more pre-
cious . . . than property rights .... ,,12 The Court's problem cen-
tered around a conflict between the sanctity of the family, and its
concern for upholding the full faith and credit clause. The problem
was resolved by holding that a mother deserved as much protection
in her rights to child custody as in her rights to alimony payments. 3
Thus, the children were allowed to remain with their mother, de-
spite the fact that the father had legal custody.
May, standing alone, could be read as holding that in the absence
of truly unusual circumstances, mothers hold all the rights afforded
by the Constitution and fathers hold fewer. The first real challenge
to this conception came twenty years later when an irrebutable
presumption that all unwed fathers were unfit as parents was
challenged."
In Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, Jerry Rothstein claimed
to be the father of an illegitimate boy who had been placed for
adoption after the natural mother surrendered him. 5 The father was
denied a hearing in Wisconsin and consequently appealed to the
Supreme Court. By this time, the child had been placed with an
adoptive family and while the Court ordered that Rothstein be given
10. 10 Am. JUR. 2d Bastards § 60, at 889 (1963).
Most courts, until quite recently, would probably have agreed with the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in Bruce v. Bruce, 285 P. 30 (Okla. 1930):
Courts'know that mother love is a dominant trait in the heart of a mother, even
in the weakest of women. It is of divine origin, and in nearly all cases far exceeds
and surpasses the parental affection of the father. Every just man recognizes the
fact that minor children need the constant bestowal of the mother's care and love.
It is for these reasons courts are loath to deprive the mother of the care and
custody of her children, and will not do so, . . . unless it clearly appears that she
is an improper person to be intrusted with their care and custody.
Id. at 37.
11. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
12. 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
13. Id. at 534-36.
14. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
15. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
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a hearing, it directed the lower court to consider the length of time
that the child had been with the adoptive parents. 6 Although subse-
quently the court on remand found Rothstein to be a fit parent, he
was denied custody because the court found it to be in the "best
interest of the child" to leave the child with the adoptive parents.' 7
The implications of Rothstein are clarified in light of Stanley v.
Illinois.'8 The Court in Stanley held that a putative father has a
right to a hearing when the custody of a child "he has sired and
raised" is at issue. The natural mother of the illegitimate children
had died, and the state of Illinois sought to take the children as
wards. The Court expressly noted that the natural parents had lived
together intermittently for eighteen years.'" Once again, the Court
dealt with the issue in terms of the "best interest of the child." The
Court held that an unwed father must be treated exactly as a wed-
ded father, otherwise, there was a violation of equal protection.'"
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, recognized that a state's
interest in caring for children in the Stanleys' circumstances did not
go much further than to insure that the putative father was a fit
person to care for them. The Court chastised the State of Illinois for
trying to take the easy way out in dealing with this important area
of people's lives. Thus, the convenience of raising a presumption
was not considered proper justification when a family unit was at
stake."
I1. THE CONCEPT OF THE FAMILY
Another major confrontation with concepts of "family" occurred
in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. 22A city ordinance in Belle Terre,
New York, prohibited dwellings from being occupied by other than
"single families," defined to mean one or more persons related by
blood, adoption, or marriage, or not more than two unmarried per-
16. Id. at 1051.
17. The Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which
determined that the child should remain with his adoptive parents and not be placed in the
care of a parent whom the child had never known. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 207
N.W.2d 826, 828 (Wis. 1973). The best-interest-of-the-child test varies from state to state.
Some statutes specify factors that may be considered in applying the standard including the
sex, age, and preference of the child. Other statutes contain presumptions based on the sex
of the parent. However, while there is only a general concensus about what is best for a child,
there is a strong, specific concensus about what is bad for the child (e.g., physical abuse).
Also, some short-term predictions about human behavior and parental care can be readily
made (e.g., chronic alcoholism or psychosis that would be difficult to modify).
18. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
19. Id. at 646.
20. Id. at 649.
21. Id. at 658.
22. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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sons.13 Furthermore, boarding houses, fraternity houses, apart-
ments, and other types of multiple dwellings were specifically pro-
hibited by the ordinance. When a group of six college students
leased a house in order to live together as a "family," and were
found in violation of the law, they challenged the ordinance on
several constitutional grounds. The students argued that "if two
unmarried people can constitute a 'family,' there is no reason why
three or four may not." 4 The Court rejected the petitioners' argu-
ment, holding that it was a matter for the legislature to decide, and
that any boundary drawn by the law would include some and ex-
clude others. The Court reasoned that since the ordinance provided
for two people living together while unmarried, an inherent unfair-
ness or animosity toward that lifestyle was not present. Moreover,
the Court held the "family" classification not suspect, and therefore
the ordinance was only required to be rationally related to a legiti-
mate state objective and not subject to strict scrutiny on review..2 5
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting, expressed the view that the
fourteenth amendment guarantees the right to "establish a home"
as part of each citizen's liberty interest. "The selection of one's
living companions involves similar choices as to the emotional, so-
cial, or economic benefits to be derived from alternative living ar-
rangements. 26 The ordinance, Justice Marshall declared, should be
struck down because it discriminates against mere lifestyle, allow-
ing an unlimited number of blood-related or marriage-related per-
sons to live together, but limiting the number of people who may
have a valid relationship built out of love, friendship, and religious
or other purposes.Y
The Court's notion of "family" as related to concepts of blood and
marriage was confirmed in 1977 in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.28 The City of East Cleveland had sentenced Mrs. Moore
to pay a $25 fine and spend five days incarcerated under an ordi-
nance which, like Belle Terre's, limited homes to a "single family."
Unlike Belle Terre's, however, the East Cleveland ordinance pre-
cluded certain categories of blood relatives from living together. In
Mrs. Moore's case, the ordinance precluded her grandson, whose
mother was dead, from residing with her. The Supreme Court found
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 7-8.
25. Id. (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
26. 416 U.S. at 15.
27. Id. at 16.
28. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
29. Id. at 496-97.
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that while history counsels caution and retraint, it does not require
''cutting off any protection of family rights at the first convenient,
if arbitrary boundary-the boundary of the nuclear family. ' 3" In
Belle Terre, the Court had rationalized that the increased car
traffic, crowds, and noise associated with multiple-family condi-
tions justified the city's concern.' However, when faced with an
issue of grandmothers and grandsons the Court found that concerns
of congestion and monetary burdens on the school system, parking
problems, and other hazards were not justifiable rationales for the
ordinance. 3 The Court set out a list of family rights that had been
considered particularly important including: "freedom of choice
with respect to childbearing, . . . rights of parents to the custody
and companionship of their own children, [and] . . . traditional
parental authority in matters of child rearing and education." 3 The
Court then stated, "But unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons
why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded
shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we
cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these precedents
to the family choice involved in this case. ' '
Therefore, the Court's concept of the family is one of tradition,
emphasizing the traditional modes of the nuclear family-a married
couple with or without children-or the extended family, several
generations all under the same roof. These models, or some reasona-
ble variation thereof, including two unmarried persons, will protect
the "family" against governmental intrusion. 35
IV. THE CONFLIcT OF PROTECTED INTERESTS
The Supreme Court was faced with conflicting interests of various
30. Id. at 502.
31. 416 U.S. at 9.
32. 431 U.S. at 499-500.
33. Id. at 500-01 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 501. The Court emphasized its function under the due process clause by pointing
out that this liberty interest as it pertains to the family is not specifically set out nor limited
by the Constitution. The Court concluded:
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition . ...
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the
members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and espe-
cially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.
Id. at 503-04 (footnotes omitted).
35. The Court stated that "[tihere are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced
protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions
of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 502 (emphasis in original).
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agencies in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform (OFFER).3" New York State procedures regarding re-
moval of foster children from foster homes required ten days ad-
vance notification to foster parents and a departmental conference
prior to removal. The children could then be transferred, but if the
foster parents maintained their objections, an adversary adminis-
trative hearing with judicial review would be available. Foster par-
ents, however, continued their allegations that there was insuffi-
cient due process protection for their liberty interests. 7 The Court
concentrated on the adequacy of the removal procedures despite the
appellees' (OFFER's) assertion that having a young child in a home
for more than a year created the psychological equivalent of the
natural family.3"
Not surprisingly, the Court reached the conclusion that the rela-
tionship is not similar enough to that of a protected "family." The
Court implied, however, that there is a degree of the family relation
present and it is larger and in need of greater protection than other
groups of unrelated individuals. Referring to its decision in Belle
Terre, the Court stated that a foster family serves by fulfilling the
child's emotional needs in the same way and to the same extent as
a natural family. "For this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster
family as a mere collection of unrelated individuals."3 The Court
pointed out that when the state has been "a partner from the out-
set," as it has in the foster family arrangement, state law is not so
intrusive when it sets the bounds of the relationship. Furthermore,
the relationship was created by statute and contract between foster
parents and the State of New York, and was therefore held to be
entitled to only a limited degree of constitutional protection." But
could not the same be said of the marriage relationship?
The Court in OFFER seemed to be struggling with the balance
among the liberty interests of the foster parents, the natural par-
ents, and the child." In most cases the legal rights of the natural
parents have not been terminated and if the parents have not been
adjudicated unfit, they have an absolute right to get the children
back at any time. Thus, a clash of procedural protection will be
unavoidable when more than one party has a liberty interest. No
matter what kind of liberty interest may arise in the foster family
36. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
37. Id. at 842. The foster parents complained of procedures which removed the children
not for cause, but for administrative reasons or to return the children to their natural parents.
38. Id. at 839.
39. Id. at 844.
40. Id. at 845.
41. Id. at 846-47.
THE UNWED FATHER
by virtue of its relationship with a foster child, that interest fades
considerably if the child is being removed in order to return the
child to its natural parents." The Court never actually resolved
whether the foster family had a constitutionally protected "liberty
interest," although dicta certainly implied that they did, but the
Court held that New York procedure would have been adequate in
any case. 3
V. PROTECTION FOR THE NATURAL UNWED FATHER
As a result of Stanley v. Illinois, the practice of notifying and
granting hearings to unwed fathers has become the norm." In Flor-
ida, section 63.062 (1)(b), Florida Statutes, requires consent from
known and legally recognized fathers prior to adoption and section
63.062 (4) provides for notice to known parents." The statute has
been held to provide that failure of the putative father to acknowl-
edge and support his children severs his intervention right to all
subsequent adoption proceedings." This is one step beyond
Rothstein which held that the child was to remain with an adoptive
family in lieu of the father who had never actually lived with his
illegitimate son. 7
In re Malpica-Orsini, a New York case, held that state adoption
laws entitling putative fathers to notice and a hearing, but permit-
ting the adoption even if they withheld consent, were constitu-
tional. 8 In Pennsylvania, courts have been reluctant to terminate
parental rights without hearings which include the unwed father.
The effect of this reluctance may be to force unwed mothers to have
some third party come into court and swear that he is the father."
Adoption of Walker, decided after Orsini, held that to distinguish
procedurally between unwed fathers and unwed mothers was illegal,
based on the state's equal rights amendment. 50
After Stanley, it was questionable whether the rights of the father
would have been the same if the child had never lived with him.
Some doubt also remained as to whether the Supreme Court in-
42. Id. at 846-48.
43. Id. at 855-56.
44. See H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 685-89 (1976); 61 CORNELL L. REv. 312, 314-16 (1976); 81
DICK. L. REv. 857, 858-59 (1977); 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 480, 488 (1977).
45. FLA. STAT. § 63.062(1)(b), (4) (1977).
46. See Department of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (putative father who had shown no interest in his child had no constitutional
right to be notified of adoption proceedings). See generally 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 480 (1977).
47. 207 N.W.2d at 826-28.
48. 331 N.E.2d 486, 491-93 (N.Y. 1975).
49. See 81 DICK. L. REv. 857, 864-65 (1977).
50. 360 A.2d 603, 605-06 (Pa. 1976).
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tended a putative father to have a right to veto a proposed adop-
tion-by withholding consent-or if he merely had a right to partici-
pate in the adoption hearings."' In 1978, the Court's ruling in the
case of Quilloin v. Walcott provided some answers and raised some
new questions."
The Quilloin case involved a constitutional challenge to the Geor-
gia adoption statute, which provided that consent of both natural
parents is necessary before a child may be adopted by a third per-
son, except when the child is illegitimate. 3 In the case of illegiti-
mates, only the consent of the natural mother is required. The Geor-
gia law does make provision, however, for the natural father to
legitimate the child without marrying the mother and thereby avoid
the operation of the statute. 5'
The natural mother in Quilloin had been married to a man other
than the child's natural father for about nine years. Her husband
then sought to adopt the child. The boy had always lived with the
couple and had never resided with his natural father .5 Georgia had
begun to notify putative fathers of illegitimate children who were
being adopted, and when the natural father was notified, he filed
an objection, a writ of habeas corpus for visitation rights, and a
petition for legitimation."6 All were denied, and the child was
adopted over his objections. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court decision. Mr. Quilloin, the putative father, appealed
on the ground that the Stanley decision had given unwed natural
fathers equal standing with natural mothers.57
The Court referred to OFFER's enunciated distinctions between
natural families and other types of legal relationships among the
adults, the state, and the children. 51 Mr. Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority in Quilloin, expressed the view that although the
51. See, e.g., 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312, 316 (1976).
52. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
53. The Court referred to the Georgia statute, GA. STAT. § 74-403(3) (1978): "Illegitimate
Children.-If the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice. Such
consent, however, shall not be required if the mother has surrendered all of her rights to said
child to a licensed child-placing agency, or to the State Department of Family and Children
Services." 434 U.S. at 248-49 n.3.
54. A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by petition-
ing the superior court of the county of his residence, . . . praying the legitimation
of such child. Of this application the mother, if alive, shall have notice. Upon such
application, presented and filed, the court may pass an order declaring said child
to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the father in the same manner as
if born in lawful wedlock, and the name by which he or she shall be known.
Id. at 249 n.4.
55. Id. at 247.
56. Id. at 249-50.
57. Id. at 247-53.
58. Id. at 255.
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interest of the child is paramount, that reason alone may not be
sufficient to remove a child from his natural parents over their
objection. On the other hand, the interest of the child may well be
enough to remove the child from a foster home. The Court pointed
out that rather than breaking up a family relationship, the adoption
of the child in Quilloin would secure an existing one. 51
Mr. Justice Marshall stated with regard to equal protection that
treating an unwed father like Mr. Quilloin differently than a father
who is divorced, but who did live with the child, is not improper.
Mr Quilloin had never supported his son; however, in comparison,
a divorced father would normally have borne a part of the responsi-
bility of raising his child. He would at least have been the legal
guardian of the child while married to the mother. Thus, the Court
found that applying a standard of "best interest of the child" did
not negate the natural father's liberty interest, and affirmed the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Georgia. 0
VI. AFTER Quilloin. v. Walcott
The distinction implicit in the Court's decision between the type
of unwed father in Stanley, and the father in Quilloin may offer
some guidelines to state lawmakers so that they may find constitu-
tionally permissible classifications for their statutes. Clearly, a bio-
logical father must be notified and allowed to be heard before the
child may be adopted by someone else. Furthermore, the biological
father will not be presumed unfit as a parent.
At the same time, Quilloin has raised some questions which will
frustrate lawmakers when they attempt to define the limits of proc-
ess which a state must accord a putative father. In other words,
there remains a question of how far a state must go in seeking out
and notifying putative fathers before granting adoptions on the con-
sent of the mother alone." Quilloin indicates that if the natural
father has not been greatly involved with his child, minimal process
such as publication in the legal notice section of the local newspaper
would be sufficient. 62
While protecting the rights of putative fathers, the Court and the
lawmakers must eventually consider the rights of privacy which
may be invaded. Clearly, there is potential for embarrassment if
individuals are named as biological fathers falsely or in ignorance,
59. Id. at 255-56.
60. Id. at 256.
61. For a discussion of this question as it applies to Florida, see generally 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 480 (1977).
62. See generally Dobbs, supra note 8.
1979]
568 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:559
as well as to actual fathers who wish to remain "unnamed." At least
one state, Illinois, has considered this possibility and has placed a
disclaimer certificate in its notifications which can be filled out and
returned. The individual's name is then removed from the proceed-
ings unless further legal action is pressed against him. 3 Whether
this prevents damage to an innocent's reputation remains to be
seen.
In reiteration, Stanley holds that a putative father may not be
presumed unfit to be a parent, and if he wants to have the child in
his custody, or to prevent adoption by someone else, his relationship
with, and the best interest of, the child must be weighed in deter-
mining the outcome. 4 Furthermore, Quilloin has now made it clear
that natural fatherhood alone will not give equal standing with a fit
natural mother such that the natural father may withhold consent
and block the adoption of the child by a third party."e Therefore,
laws such as those of Florida and Georgia,66 complete with a legiti-
mation avenue which permits severing a putative father's right
when the father has not acknowledged and supported his children,
have passed constitutional scrutiny pursuant to the Quilloin analy-
sis.
The apparent clarity of the state of the law, however, has now
been thrown into some doubt by Caban v. Mohammed.7 In Caban
the Court resolved the issue not decided in Quilloin. That is,
whether equal protection requirements preclude mothers from being
treated differently than fathers by reason of gender. The Court held
that New York State's adoption laws were unconstitutional because
they allowed the natural mother to block an adoption by the natural
father and his wife, without allowing the putative father to block the
adoption of the child by the natural mother and her husband. The
Court held that in order for the adoption statute to be constitu-
tional, there had to be a substantial relationship between the stat-
ute and the state objective, that is, adoption. The Court found that
no relationship existed. In other words the means did not constitu-
tionally reach the desired end. 8 The Court, however, noted that the
father in Caban, unlike the father in Quilloin, had lived up to his
responsibilities and fulfilled his parental role with the children." It
63. Act of Sept. 6, 1973, P.A. 78-531, § 1, ILL. Rgv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9.4 (1975).
64. 405 U.S. at 658.
65. 434 U.S. at 255-56.
66. FiA. STAT. § 63.062(1)(b) (1977); GA. CODE § 74-203 (1978).
67. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
68. Id. at 1763-69.
69. Id. at 1763. In fact, the children in Caban had resided with their natural father for
more than two years.
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is far too early to evaluate the impact of this decision. Whether a
statute like New York's is violative of equal protection in that it
draws a distinction between married fathers and unmarried ones is
a question left unanswered. The Court also left unanswered whether
a putative father may have his rights terminated in adoption pro-
ceedings when there has been no showing of unfitness.7" Only state
laws such as those of Pennsylvania, with its equal rights amend-
ment, can be sure of conformity with Caban. Laws of states like
Georgia and Florida, which are similar to the New York statute,
may eventually require revision.7
VII. CONCLUSION
Had Mr. Quilloin availed himself of the Georgia procedure that
allows legitimation without marriage, and had he lived up to his
responsibilities as a father, he could have held up adoption of his
son indefinitely, since he would have had the same rights as a natu-
ral wedded father.7" Although the Court has not resolved whether
the due process and equal protection clauses demand that this pro-
cedure be made available by a state, it would seem likely that the
Court would find it to be necessary.
The Court has recognized in Rothstein, OFFER, Quilloin, and
Caban that persons who have no biological relationship with the
child may develop a constitutionally protected interest which will
give them standing to claim that the best interest of the child is
served by adoption. Where the link with the biological parent is
weak, as in Quilloin, and the link with the "psychological" parents
is strong, as in Rothstein, the latter will probably continue to pre-
vail. On the other hand, Belle Terre, (where there was no "best
interest of the child" to consider) indicates that there are limits to
how far the Court will extend its concept of the family.
Lawmakers must consider how they want to balance these inter-
ests. There is certainly a valid state interest in the welfare of the
child. A natural extension of that interest is the encouragement of
70. See id. at 1766-69.
71. The Caban Court stated:
In sum, we believe that § 111 [of the New York statute] is another example of
"overbroad generalizations" in gender-based classifications. The effect of New
York's classification is to disciminate against unwed fathers even when their iden-
tity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child.
The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being
invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judg-
ment as to the fate of their children.
Id. at 1769 (citations omitted).
72. See Outman, Georgia's New Adoption Laws, 13 GA. ST. B.J. 172, 172-74 (1977).
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adoption of illegitimates. Although adoption cannot be promoted at
the expense of protected liberty interests of either natural parent,
the state cannot allow the liberty interest of one parent to outweigh
that of the other. The only constitutionally satisfactory remedy may
be to apply the same rather rigid requirements to both parties, and
where there is a conflict, to terminate the rights of the parent with
the weakest standing. On the other hand, perhaps the solution is to
allow adoption of a relatively loose sort, which would not require the
termination of parental rights of either party. The disadvantages of
such a system would at least be no worse than the present child
custody laws.
